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IAN HOLLIDAY, MAW HTUN AUNG, AND CINDY JOELENE
Institution Building in Myanmar
The Establishment of Regional and State Assemblies
ABSTRACT
Myanmar has long been rigidly centralized. In 2011, however, 14 regional and state
assemblies were established. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, this article evaluates
the performance of 10 assemblies toward the end of their initial five-year mandate.
It finds little evidence of a territorial dispersal of power.
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FOR MOST OF ITS POSTCOLONIAL HISTORY, the country known currently as
Myanmar (until 1989 as Burma) has been rigidly centralized.1 In the year or
two prior to independence in January 1948, limited attempts were made to
fashion a system of government that would be sensitive to the urgent social
reality of diverse racial and ethnic identities found across the territory. The
fractious parliamentary period from 1948 to 1962 also witnessed sporadic moves
of this kind. However, any possibility of decentralizing the state was largely
eliminated by a March 1962 military coup, which sought precisely to repudiate
forceful federalist tendencies inside the country. Although some efforts were
then made to address interethnic tensions, they came to nothing, and for close
to half a century the nation was ruled on a strictly unionist basis, paralleling
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predominant military command structures. Proponents of a territorial distri-
bution of power, seeking formally to allocate governance authority, functions,
and funding to sub-national tiers, were often cast as enemies of the state.
Only in May 2008 was decentralization again given any formal political
backing, in the provisions for 14 partially elected, partially appointed regional
and state assemblies written into a draft constitution endorsed by the people
in a patently manipulated referendum. In November 2010, elections for the
assemblies ﬁnally took place as part of the ﬁrst national poll in 20 years, and
in January 2011 the 14 assemblies were ofﬁcially inaugurated. Though given
a ﬁve-year mandate, they had few powers or resources. Nevertheless, among
the many changes witnessed in the current transitional period, these reforms
remain potentially signiﬁcant because building territorial institutions for
a fractured country is clearly a critical task. In these still-early days, it is
therefore important to evaluate Myanmar’s early steps in forming regional
and state assemblies.
This article does that by examining the performance of 10 regional and
state assemblies toward the end of their initial ﬁve-year mandate. The ﬁrst
section sets the historical context by surveying decentralization and federal-
ism initiatives in Burma/Myanmar. The second provides institutional con-
text by reviewing the constitutional underpinnings and electoral mandates of
the assemblies. The third outlines the methodology used to gather data on 10
of the 14 assemblies. The fourth presents the ﬁndings, collected chieﬂy
through interviews with assembly members and community leaders. The
ﬁfth considers how the assemblies’ shortcomings might be addressed. The
ﬁnal section is a brief conclusion. As Myanmar approaches a November 2015
general election that will reconﬁgure not only its national parliament but also
its regional and state assemblies, the argument presented here is that the
14 assemblies are only slowly ﬁnding their feet, and to date are doing little
to generate a meaningful territorial dispersal of power. Myanmar remains
a strongly centralized state.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Britain’s imperial intervention in Burma, through wars fought in 1824–26, 1852,
and 1885, established the foundations for modern governance.2 Crucially,
2. ThantMyint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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however, those foundations, which saw Burma made a province of the British
Raj for most of the colonial period, were not uniform. In the mainly Burman
heartland, which the British called Burma Proper (and later Ministerial or
Parliamentary Burma), traditional institutions were destroyed and replaced
by direct rule. In the peripheral zones, peopled chieﬂy by minority ethnic
peoples, which the British named the Excluded Areas (and later the Sched-
uled or Frontier Areas), indigenous institutions were maintained and used as
conduits for indirect rule on the model developed in India. These distinctions
were exacerbated during World War II, when for three years many Burmans,
led by General Aung San and the fabled ‘‘thirty comrades,’’ fought on the side
of OK the Japanese, while most minority ethnic groups remained loyal to
Britain and the Allies.3
The result was that experiences of governance in the colonial period were
disparate, and expectations of territorial arrangements in the postcolonial
era were divergent.4 While Burman leaders looked ahead to a uniﬁed inde-
pendent nation, minority leaders sought degrees of autonomy stretching
even to statehood. The famous Panglong Agreement, concluded in February
1947, sought to address some of these issues, but at no more than a single
page in length, it was inevitably open to varied interpretation and myth-
making.5 Indeed, rather than pave the way for a full territorial settlement
during independence negotiations with the British in 1947, it set the stage
for a descent into civil war in 1948. While the many conﬂicts that scarred
Burma over several decades had an important ideological component
through Communist mobilization, they were also forcefully driven by ethnic
issues.6
The response of state leaders to the interethnic turmoil that enveloped the
country from the late 1940s onward was above all military rather than polit-
ical. The parliamentary interlude from 1948 to 1962 was characterized by open
contestation of power, fragile democracy, and weak governance.7 Gradually
the national army gained strength as combat units were reinforced to ﬁght
3. Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), pp. 46–71.
4. Mandy Sadan, Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories beyond the State in the Borderworlds of
Burma (Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy, 2013).
5. Matthew J. Walton, ‘‘Ethnicity, Conﬂict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong,’’
Asian Survey 48:6 (2008), pp. 889–910.
6. Martin J. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd ed. (London: Zed, 1999).
7. John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958).
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insurgencies on multiple fronts.8 In March 1962, when political elites ﬂoated
the option of a ‘‘federal seminar’’ to devise a formal settlement, military
leaders fearing state fragmentation spearheaded the coup that destroyed
Burmese democracy and effectively put an end to territorial debate. While
some attempts were made in the mid-1960s to negotiate ethnic issues, none
got far. Following the coup, implementation of an army-backed Burmese way
to socialism, though never more than utterly ineffective and deeply corrupting,
served only to enhance a militaristic focus on centralization and uniformity.9
In the state socialist era, the ofﬁcial designation of major national races and
subsidiary ethnic groups that survives to this day was enacted in Citizenship
Law 1982, which acknowledges eight major national races and 135 ethnic
groups nested within them. While many view this formulation as arbitrary
and ﬂawed in key respects, in the course of more than 30 years it has taken on
a measure of permanence. Controversially used to underpin the 2014 census,
it is now hard to contest, not least because many recognize that a debate
about nationhood and ethnicity would inevitably be divisive, and could
potentially be violent.10 At the end of the 1980s, when the state socialist order
eventually collapsed under the weight of its own internal contradictions, the
student-led democracy movement, led mainly by Burmans from the domi-
nant national race, found little common cause with the seven designated
minorities, most of which had long fought against the national army.11 In
this fragmentation of the opposition movement could be seen one dimension
of the challenge posed to national unity by ethnic diversity.
The outcome of the 1988 crisis was imposition of direct military rule,
through a junta that talked about democratization, and even held a general
election in May 1990, but did nothing to deliver progressive political reform.
Instead, it ignored the landslide victory won by the National League for
Democracy (NLD) in 1990, and moved in January 1993 to create a constitu-
tional convention tasked with building the foundations for ‘‘discipline-
ﬂourishing democracy.’’ It also reached a series of ceaseﬁre agreements with
8. Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2003).
9. Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009).
10. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Ethnicity without Meaning, Data
without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar (Amsterdam: TNI/
BCN, 2014).
11. Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review, 1989).
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ethnic militias, which delivered a measure of peace to communities long
ravaged by violence.12 For most of the 1990s and 2000s, however, issues of
territorial governance registered little advance; the constitutional convention
took 15 years to produce a text, and the ceaseﬁre deals were no more than an
undertaking to stop ﬁghting.13 Nevertheless, a fraudulent May 2008 referen-
dum, which overwhelmingly endorsed the constitution drafted by military
rulers and their associates, did generate some territorial dispersal of power.
While the constitution contains many safeguards for military oversight of
Myanmar’s democratization process, and is undergirded by a transitional
political economy of state-facilitated crony capitalism, it also provides for the
formation of 14 regional and state assemblies, from which decentralized
governments are drawn.14
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Below the central tier of government in the capital, Naypyidaw, the 2008
constitution creates 14 unicameral assemblies (or hluttaw) mapped onto
Myanmar’s seven Bamar-majority regions (previously divisions) and seven
ethnic-minority states.15 Largely from within the assemblies the document
creates regional and state executives, as well as a core complement of judicial
bodies. In this way, it brings into being a full set of decentralized institutions
within Myanmar’s 14 regions and states, which in Article 9 are all given
‘‘equal status.’’ Article 49 identiﬁes the seven regions as Ayeyarwady, Bago,
Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon, and the seven states
as Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan.
At the regional and state levels, the institution-building process begins
with the formation of decentralized assemblies. Article 161 sets out the
12. Smith, Burma.
13. Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occu-
pation, and Coexistence (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007); Martin Smith, State of Strife:
The Dynamics of Ethnic Conﬂict in Burma (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007); Zaw Oo and
Win Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceaseﬁre Accords (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007); Tom
Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-ﬁre Agreements in Burma (Amsterdam:
Transnational Institute, 2009).
14. Lee Jones, ‘‘The Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition,’’ Journal of Contemporary Asia
44:1 (2014), pp. 144–170.
15. In addition, the 2008 constitution creates ﬁve self-administered zones, one self-administered
division, and one union territory (comprising Nay Pyi Taw and its surrounding townships). None of
these is examined here.
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arrangements under three main headings. First, two members are elected per
township.16 Second, additional members are elected when there are concen-
trations of national races beyond the dominant national race in the region or
state. Third, as with the bicameral national parliament, members are nom-
inated by the commander-in-chief of the defense services in the ratio of one
appointed active military ofﬁcer per three elected members. In this way, the
memberships of the territorial assemblies are given a basic composition
paralleling those found in both houses of the national parliament: 75 percent
are civilian politicians elected through standard democratic procedures;
25 percent are serving military ofﬁcers appointed by the country’s top military
leader.
Regarding the functioning of the assemblies, Article 167 allows for the
formation of committees and bodies, and for the co-optation of ‘‘suitable
citizens.’’ Article 174 mandates that each assembly convene a regular session
at least once a year, and that the interval between regular sessions shall not
exceed 12 months. Article 188 gives the assemblies the right to enact laws
related to matters prescribed separately in Schedule Two. The sectors into
which these matters are grouped are: ﬁnance and planning; economic; agri-
culture and livestock breeding; energy, electricity, mining, and forestry;
industrial; transport, communication, and construction; social; and manage-
ment. Few of the detailed areas listed under these headings are signiﬁcant.
Article 254 sanctions tax- and revenue-raising powers speciﬁed in Schedule
Five. Since the capacity to tax income is very limited, there is no real ﬁscal
decentralization.17
As to regional and state executives, Article 261 speciﬁes that the chief
minister shall be chosen by the national president from among the members
of the regional or state assembly, and thereby be accountable upward to the
president rather than downward to the assembly. Formally, the president’s
nominee must be endorsed by the decentralized assembly. However, rejection
is allowed only if the candidate can be proven not to meet the qualiﬁcations
16. In Myanmar, the administrative hierarchy has several levels. Villages are clustered into village
tracts. Towns, urban wards, and village tracts are brought together as townships. Townships are
grouped as districts. Districts are assembled into either regions or states. The seven regions and seven
states collectively form the bulk of the union.
17. Hamish Nixon and Cindy Joelene, Fiscal Decentralization in Myanmar: Towards a Roadmap
for Reform (Yangon: Myanmar Development Resource Institute—Centre for Economic and Social
Development and Asia Foundation, 2014).
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prescribed for the position in the constitution. Article 262 states that regular
ministers shall be chosen by the chief minister from among the members of the
regional or state assembly, or from beyond its ranks. At the same time, how-
ever, it assigns the allocation of portfolios to the national president, who also
distributes portfolios among ministers for the leading minority national races
within a region or state. It requires the commander-in-chief of the defense
services to nominate a serving military ofﬁcer as minister for security and
border affairs. Regarding judicial institutions, Article 266 of the constitution
states that the national president shall appoint an advocate-general from among
the assembly members.18
Following up on these constitutional provisions, the ﬁrst stage in establish-
ing the new territorial assemblies was holding regional and state elections as
part of the November 2010 general election that also brought into being the
bicameral national assembly. Well ahead of the poll, the NLD, still the major
opposition party, announced that it would not contest elections held under
what leader Aung San Suu Kyi in March 2010 dismissed as ‘‘unjust’’ laws.19
Although a faction later split off to ﬁeld candidates under the banner of the
National Democratic Force and many ethnic parties also sought seats, the
outcome was a landslide win for the military-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP). In the lower house of the national parliament, it
won 79 percent of the seats contested through the poll. In the upper house, it
won 77 percent.20
Results in the territorial assemblies were broadly similar. Out of 661 elected
seats across all 14 assemblies, the USDP won 494 (75 percent). The only other
parties to register even double-digit seat counts were the National Unity
Party (NUP) with 45 (7 percent), the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
(SNDP) with 36 (5 percent), and the Rakhine Nationalities Development
Party (RNDP) with 19 (3 percent).21 As also happened at the national level,
military appointees were then added to the assemblies in the speciﬁed ratio of
one to three, bringing the overall total membership up to 883. Few members
18. Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
(2008) (Yangon: Ministry of Information, 2008).
19. Ba Kaung, ‘‘Message from Suu Kyi,’’ Irrawaddy, March 12, 2010.
20. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, A Changing Ethnic Landscape:
Analysis of Burma’s 2010 Polls (Amsterdam: TNI/BCN, 2010).
21. The results of Myanmar’s 2010 election in terms of seat distribution by political party across
the 14 regional and state assemblies are presented in Burma Fund UNOfﬁce, Burma’s 2010 Elections:
A Comprehensive Report (New York, NY: Burma Fund UN Ofﬁce, 2011).
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were women—just 25 out of 883 (3 percent).22 In two regions (Sagaing and
Tanintharyi) and four states (Chin, Kayah, Kayin, and Mon), the assembly
contained no women at all. In two other regions (Magway and Mandalay)
and one state (Rakhine), the assembly had only one female member.23
However, hidden behind the USDP’s sweeping victory was a rather more
nuanced picture in some state (but not regional) assemblies. In Chin State,
where the total elected membership was 18, the Chin National Party and the
Chin Progressive Party each won ﬁve seats, and the Ethnic National Devel-
opment Party won one. The USDP claimed the remaining seven seats, but
still had only 39 percent of elected members. In Rakhine State, where the
total elected membership was 35, the RNDP won 18 seats, against 14 for the
USDP, cutting the USDP down to 40 percent of elected members. In Kayin
State, where the total elected membership was 17, a cluster of electoral
victories for small ethnic parties reduced the USDP to 7 seats, or 41 percent
of elected members. In Shan State, where the total elected membership was
107, the SNDP won 31 seats and in combination with a series of minor ethnic
parties and independents restricted the USDP to 54 seats, or 50 percent of
elected members.24 In no case was USDP control threatened, as the military
bloc was almost always supportive. In state assemblies there was nevertheless
something of a challenge to USDP hegemony.25
The second stage in forming the new territorial assemblies came in January
2011, when elected and appointed members ﬁrst convened. However, the
formal transfer of power from the long-standing military junta (known since
1997 as the State Peace and Development Council) to the new quasi-civilian
national government did not take place until March 30, 2011. Thus, creation
of the decentralized governments did not happen until then either. Exercising
the constitutional power vested in him, incoming President Thein Sein
nominated most of the 14 chief ministers on that date. In the ﬁrst cohort,
13 chief ministers were USDP members; 10 were former military ofﬁcers. The
single chief minister not chosen from USDP ranks was a serving brigadier
22. Paul Minoletti, Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar (Yangon:
MDRI-CESD and Asia Foundation, 2014).
23. Hamish Nixon, Cindy Joelene, Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, Thet Aung Lynn, and Matthew Arnold,
State and Region Governments in Myanmar (Yangon: MDRI-CESD and Asia Foundation, 2013),
Annex V.
24. Nixon et al., State and Region Governments in Myanmar, Annex V.
25. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Changing Ethnic Landscape.
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general drawn from the bloc of military appointees in Kayin State, where the
president’s preferred candidate failed to gain election on the USDP slate.26
Mostly, the ministers subsequently chosen by chief ministers to form the
core of the regional and state executives were elected assembly members.
Only in Chin State were two ministers drawn from the wider community
(as provided for in Article 262 of the constitution).27 Active-duty military
ofﬁcers were also appointed as regional and state ministers for security and
border affairs by the commander-in-chief of the defense services. Addition-
ally, national race ministers were appointed by the relevant national minister
for ethnic affairs, ranging in number from zero in Chin State to seven in Shan
State. Nine regions and states had either one or two such ministers.28 Among
a total of 169 cabinet ministers, 117 (69 percent) came from the USDP and 14
(8 percent) were serving military ofﬁcers. Unsurprisingly, only four (2 per-
cent) were women: two in Kachin State, and one each in Ayeyarwady and
Yangon Regions.29 Broadly, the portfolios distributed by Thein Sein among
these ministers were uniform across the 14 cabinets. Typically, there were
9 regular portfolios, plus a 10th for security and border affairs, plus varying
numbers of national race portfolios.
In contrast to the uniformity imposed on regional and state executives by
the centralized choice of chief minister and allocation of ministerial portfo-
lios, the regional and state legislatures created in the early months of 2011 were
quite diverse. With the main driver being the number of townships in
a jurisdiction, assembly sizes varied widely. At one extreme, Shan State had
143 elected and appointed members, Yangon Region had 123, and Sagaing
Region had 101. At the other, Kayah State had only 20 elected and appointed
members, Kayin State had 23, Chin State had 24, and Tanintharyi Region
had 28. The fact that almost all cabinet members were drawn from within the
14 assemblies meant that in jurisdictions with small populations, and there-
fore small assemblies, the executive was larger than the legislature. In Kayah
State, the assembly of 20 formed in early 2011 had 15 elected members from
the USDP and 5 military appointees. Among the 20, 10 USDP members and
1 military appointee were given ministerial portfolios, generating an
11-member executive. Left as ordinary members of the legislature were only
26. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Changing Ethnic Landscape, pp. 51–52.
27. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Changing Ethnic Landscape, p. 54.
28. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Changing Ethnic Landscape, p. 55.
29. Transnational Institute and Burma Centrum Nederland, Changing Ethnic Landscape, p. 55.
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9 members, of whom a mere 5 were elected. Similarly, in Kayin State
a 13-member executive faced an assembly of 10, of whom again just 5 were
elected.
Finally, the by-elections that were held on April 1, 2012, were important
nationally: this time, the NLD did compete, and won overwhelmingly. Aung
San Suu Kyi was returned to the lower house of parliament from the Kawhmu
constituency, and instantly became the most prominent member of an NLD
bloc of 41 members split between the lower house (37 seats) and the upper
house (4 seats). At regional and state levels, however, the by-elections were
largely insigniﬁcant.
METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the initial performance of Myanmar’s 14 regional and state
assemblies, we adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, we drew on interview
and focus group material plus documentary analysis gathered across nine
months from July 2012 to April 2013 by a set of researchers working for the
Myanmar Development Research Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social
Development and the Asia Foundation. This team conducted a total of 77
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in two regions
(Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi) and four states (Chin, Kayin, Mon, and
Shan).30 It looked mainly at regional and state executives, but also necessarily
generated data relevant to our parallel analysis of regional and state assem-
blies. Second, in July and August 2013 we undertook an additional tranche of
20 semi-structured interviews in three regions (Bago, Mandalay, and Yangon)
and one state (Kachin), and at the same time updated our documentary
analysis.31 This second tranche drew directly on the methodology used in
the ﬁrst. Third, for the period from August 2013 to July 2015 we monitored
the limited coverage of the assemblies in national newspapers to amass sup-
plementary research material. We thereby generated core ﬁeldwork data from
ﬁve regions and ﬁve states covering much of the assemblies’ initial ﬁve-year
mandate.
Missing from our ﬁeldwork data are the four assemblies in Magway and
Sagaing Regions and Kayah and Rakhine States. By and large, pragmatic
30. Cindy Joelene participated in all of these interviews and focus group discussions.
31. Maw Htun Aung led all of these interviews, and Ian Holliday participated in some of them.
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considerations informed our selection criteria. To begin with, we decided
that coverage of more than 70 percent of the decentralized assemblies would
generate a sufﬁcient basis for drawing conclusions about them all. Next, we
ruled out Magway Region because it is quite homogeneous and dominated
by the USDP, making it very similar to neighboring Mandalay Region. We
eliminated Sagaing Region because it is large, and has a dispersed assembly
membership, and is thus hard to access in the rainy season, when we under-
took our second tranche of interviews. We left out Kayah State because it
overlaps with Chin State in terms of small size, and with other eastern states
in terms of key issues, while also being a more challenging place for ﬁeldwork.
Finally, we set aside Rakhine State because of the grave sectarian conﬂict that
erupted in June and October 2012, pitting Buddhists against Muslims and
generating security measures and political problems that made it almost
impossible to conduct scientiﬁc data collection anywhere in the state.32
Although we did gather a small amount of data about these four assemblies
by monitoring national newspapers, they do not form a core part of our
analysis.
Within our ﬁve regions and ﬁve states, our ﬁeldwork focused mainly on
elected assembly members contacted through party networks, although in all
jurisdictions we also talked to key members of civil society. Inevitably we
used snowball sampling methods: in a system no more than a few years
removed from a long authoritarian interlude, and thus still characterized
by much political sensitivity, it is above all through personal and professional
contacts that interviews can be arranged. Within and across the 10 jurisdic-
tions, we sought to ensure reasonably balanced party representation, and we
managed to talk to elected members from more than one party in every
assembly. However, we did also experience some difﬁculties in accessing the
dominant USDP, with the result that other parties are overrepresented
among our respondents. Our interviews mostly took place in party ofﬁces,
but on occasion they were held in government bureaus. All were conducted
in local languages (mainly Bamar but also in minority languages in ethnic
states). In each case we used a semi-structured questionnaire (which is
reﬂected in our ﬁndings below).
32. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘All You Can Do Is Pray’’: Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic
Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).
International Crisis Group, The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013).
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Across the table from us, we occasionally encountered individuals, but
more commonly we talked to small groups of elected assembly members,
often supplemented by party ofﬁcials. The shortest interview ran to 45 min-
utes and the longest to three hours. Most lasted for more than an hour. We
did not record any sessions, but instead took handwritten notes and ﬁlled
them out as soon as the interview was over. To supplement our ﬁeldwork
data, we analyzed primary and secondary documents. We were also handed
some documentation by some respondents. One instance was a USDP man-
ual for assembly members. Others were booklets explaining legal issues and
administrative matters.
Our general impression was that our respondents were frank in talking
with us. At the same time, we noted greater openness among regular mem-
bers than among ministers, and among members drawn from beyond the
USDP and NUP, which was the main military-backed party in the 1990
general election and to this day retains links with the defense services.
Reinforcing this impression was the excessive formalism of many of our
ministerial and USDP respondents, and their desire to stick closely to
a description of how the territorial assemblies are supposed to function, rather
than how they actually do function. Indeed, some USDP and NUP respon-
dents brought to our interviews well-thumbed, pocket-sized copies of the
2008 constitution, to which they made frequent reference while speaking.
Overall, our sense was that these members did not feel entirely comfortable
talking through institutional issues. This may have reﬂected the fact that the
government compounds in which we tended to meet regional and state
ministers were typically over-policed. Almost everywhere we went, we needed
an appointment to enter the compound. Inside, even some of the bureau staff
were police ofﬁcers, though apparently engaged in secretarial work alongside
their security duties. Unsurprisingly, the tone of the interviews conducted in
these conditions was quite guarded and formal. At the extreme, in Shan State
the interview team was followed everywhere by Special Branch ofﬁcers.
Despite these constraints, we gathered rich empirical data from our
respondents.
FINDINGS
Our ﬁndings can be grouped into the ﬁve main areas of inquiry found in our
semi-structured questionnaire: proﬁles of assembly members; structural
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factors facing regional and state assemblies; internal relationships; external
relationships; and engagement with key policy issues. While many of our
interviews ranged onto territory not captured by the questionnaire, these ﬁve
areas remained the major topics of interest to our respondents and also to us.
PROF ILES OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS . These concern issues such as age, gender,
time committed to duties, and so on. The proﬁles are strikingly uniform. The
members of all the assemblies we visited were overwhelmingly mature men
from established, or even establishment, families. In regional assemblies, they
were broadly Bamar, and in state assemblies they typically came from the
dominant ethnic group, though neither of these categorizations was rigid.
Strikingly, few members were below the age of 50; many were 60 to 70; few
were female. Clearly these skewed proﬁles partly reﬂect the landslide won by
the USDP in the 2010 general election, and the age and gender composition
of a party staffed largely by senior ﬁgures from a military background or with
close military ties. However, it was not only among USDP (or NUP) mem-
bers that this kind of proﬁle was found; almost all parties conformed to it.
Quite possibly, then, the larger explanation runs deep into the society. It may
also reﬂect the incentives offered to assembly members.
In this regard, it is worth noting that only limited ﬁnancial resources are
made available. Each minister is able to claim housing in a dedicated com-
pound plus a non-accountable monthly allowance of MMK 400,000 (USD
400), and each regular member can claim a monthly stipend of MMK
200,000 (USD 200). However, these allowances have to cover all expenses,
including transportation, ofﬁce rental, secretarial support, and so on. In
consequence, some members may be out of pocket each month, and many
call on family members such as spouse, children, and grandchildren to help
out. The only exception to this broad picture is the USDP, which generally
has well-equipped ofﬁces in every region and state, and also a scale of allow-
ances for elected and appointed ofﬁcials from the village and township level
up to the national level. Partly as a result, time commitments tend to be lower
for USDP members than for all others. By and large, assembly membership is
a part-time job for USDP members, but a full-time job for members of other
parties. Given the skewed age proﬁle, it is often a retirement project for pillars
of the community.
One important issue that needs to be addressed in this proﬁle section is
the ﬁgure of the chief minister, easily the most signiﬁcant individual in all
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14 regional and state assemblies. As has already been noted, the 14 chief
ministers chosen in the ﬁrst cohort were all men. Moreover, in 13 jurisdictions
the chief minister was a USDP member, and in 10 jurisdictions he was
a former military ofﬁcer, usually with personal ties to the region or state in
question. In the other jurisdiction, Kayin State, the chief minister was a serv-
ing brigadier general. While this choice was largely contingent on an unex-
pected election reversal for a senior USDP ﬁgure, it also almost certainly
reﬂected the security situation inside the state, and in particular the existence
of ongoing conﬂict between the national army and ethnic armed groups.
It appeared designed to send a signal about the central government’s inten-
tion to engage actively in monitoring the conﬂict and, ultimately, to bring it
to an end. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Thein Sein’s replacement
of Rakhine State Chief Minister Hla Maung Tin following an outburst of
violence against international aid agencies at the end of March 2014. Three
months later, toward the end of June, Hla Maung Tin, a USDP member, was
‘‘allowed to resign,’’ and serving General Maung Maung Ohn, hitherto dep-
uty minister of home affairs in the national government, was nominated in
his place.33
STRUCTURAL FACTORS . These are issues such as the constitutional mandate of
authority, actual institutional experience and practice, general administrative
support, and so on. As has been noted, the main powers of the assemblies are
itemized in Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution, and the resource base is
speciﬁed in Schedule Five. On both counts, assemblies are heavily con-
strained. Additionally, in some spheres the legislative division between
national and regional or state-level authority is ill-deﬁned and ambiguous.
Typically, in these gray zones, the central government tends to dominate.
The result is that the residual legislative business with which assemblies can
engage tends to be limited. Minor regulatory and licensing issues fall to them,
but big strategic questions are beyond their range. Perhaps the sole corrective
to this generally bleak picture is that the assemblies are required to endorse
a regional or state development plan, which clearly has the potential to
become a key vehicle for strategic thinking but is currently a rather formal
and meaningless exercise. In 2012 and the ﬁrst half of 2013, the Chin State
33. In an earlier case dating from November 2011, Khin Zaw was removed from the post of chief
minister of Tanintharyi Region for corruption linked to the lucrative rice trade (Radio Free Asia,
‘‘Chief Minister Sacked for Bribery,’’ November 27, 2011).
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assembly processed no legislation beyond the two areas of required business:
passing a budget and endorsing a development plan. In 2013, the various
assemblies typically promulgated few laws: Sagaing 27; Mon 21; Tanintharyi 17;
Ayeyarwady 15, Mandalay 14; Rakhine 13; Shan 11; Kayah 9; Magway 8; Bago,
Kachin, and Yangon 7; Chin and Kayin 6.34
Moreover, the decentralized tiers have little control over policy implemen-
tation. Initially, the sole administrative resource on which they could call was
provided by the General Administration Department of the national Minis-
try of Home Affairs (which is one of three central ministries headed by an
active military ofﬁcer).35 Beyond the General Administration Department,
they had to rely on ﬁeld agencies of central ministries coordinated from
Naypyidaw, or on state security forces under the control of the regional or
state military commander. The Region/State Hluttaw Law 2013 made a slight
change to this by allowing each devolved assembly to prepare a budget for its
own administrative support functions. Nevertheless, the decentralized assem-
blies still have little power to appoint or dismiss ofﬁcials, most of whom are
under central control. Together with their small revenue base, the assemblies
are thus signiﬁcantly constrained.
Within the assemblies themselves, the chief minister has considerable
power. Nominated by the president, the chief minister in turn nominates
ministers and seeks conﬁrmation from the assembly. Broadly, he then con-
trols assembly business, even though formally the regional or state legislature
has oversight powers over the regional or state executive. Indeed, such is the
preponderance of the chief minister and his cabinet that the assemblies ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to exercise such powers. In one case toward the end of 2012, Hsan
Hsint, speaker of the Ayeyarwady assembly, led a failed attempt to impeach
the regional government for allegedly infringing on the rights of assembly
members. His complaints to journalists revealed how much the regional
executive disdained the regional legislature.36 In another case, in August
2014, Myint Swe, chief minister of Yangon Region, unveiled a surprise USD
8 billion city expansion plan.37 He was soon forced to backtrack and present
34. Data generated by the authors from publicly available sources.
35. Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Matthew Arnold, The General Administration Department: An Overview
of Myanmar’s Administrative Backbone (Yangon: MDRI-CESD and Asia Foundation, 2014).
36.WinKoKoLatt, ‘‘AyeyarwadyHluttawMoves to SackGovt,’’Myanmar Times, October 1, 2012.
37. May Kha, ‘‘Rangoon Expansion Plan Criticized for Poor Transparency,’’ Irrawaddy, August
25, 2014.
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the issue for debate at a special session of the regional assembly.38 However,
widespread public anger, reinforced by investigative journalism, was decisive
in making this happen.39 Overall, then, the current situation is that assem-
blies are quiescent. They usually meet twice a year for sessions of three or four
days (in rare cases up to 10 days), chieﬂy to fulﬁll their constitutional duties of
passing a budget and a mandated range of laws.40 Some hold special sessions,
but this remains unusual.
The assemblies also have committees, however, and these are generally
more active. The three standing committees in every assembly are bills,
ethnic affairs, and scrutiny. While the chairs are key ﬁgures, they tend to
be ministers, thereby reinforcing the control of decentralized governments
over decentralized assemblies. In addition, some assemblies have created up
to 10 ad hoc committees, each with a life span of one year. In Yangon Region,
however, no ad hoc committees have been formed. Standing and ad hoc
committees draft bills and receive and respond to complaints. They also
undertake ﬁeld visits to gain a better understanding of key political issues
in a region or state.
Finally, in some state assemblies, structural problems have arisen in ap-
pointments of ethnic ministers. Article 161 of the 2008 constitution provides
for ethnic minorities within state assemblies to gain ministerial representation
when their population is greater than 0.1 percent of the total national pop-
ulation (or roughly 50,000 people). In both Shan State (with seven ethnic
ministers) and Kachin State (with four), however, the presence of several such
minorities means that the provision is triggered frequently, with the result
that something akin to a divide-and-rule strategy seems to be gaining ground
across the two states. Moreover, these minorities then appear to be cast as
outsiders rather than insiders within the state, leading to controversy and
resentment among people coming under this designation.
Looking for instance at Kachin State, the four national race ministers
appointed under Article 161 represent the Bamar, Lisu, Rawang, and Shan
peoples. No great controversy attaches to the ministers for the Bamar and
Shan peoples, for each speaks for a minority in Kachin State that has majority
38. May Kha, ‘‘Rangoon Mayor Defends Controversial City Expansion Plan,’’ Irrawaddy, Sep-
tember 23, 2014.
39. Myint Swe was so angry about reports in the Irrawaddy that he placed it on a personal blacklist
(Kyaw Zwa Moe, ‘‘The Dangers of Reporting on Nepotism,’’ Irrawaddy, September 13, 2014).
40. Irrawaddy, ‘‘Can’t They Spare Time for the People?’’ September 10, 2014.
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status in other parts of the country. Separating out the Lisu and Rawang
peoples for special representation is, however, problematic. Ofﬁcially, the
Kachin national race embraces 12 subsidiary ethnic groups.41 Giving special
status to 2 of the 12 undermines the coherence of the national race, allows the
2 to claim privileges not enjoyed by the other 10, and at the same time
diminishes the status of the 2 within Kachin State by imposing on them
a separate identity. In a part of the country already having a deeply complex
relationship with the wider nation, this essentially artiﬁcial layer of complex-
ity is resented.42 Parallel problems arise in Shan State, which has 33 ofﬁcial
ethnic groups and seven ethnic ministers.
INTERNAL RELAT IONSHIPS . These comprise intra-institutional links, inter-
party contacts, civilian–military relations, and so on. As noted earlier, in all
14 jurisdictions the regional or state government is the driving force, leaving
the assembly little autonomy. Moreover, size appears to have minimal
impact, for even large assemblies in large regions (Sagaing) and large states
(Shan) are tightly controlled. To date, experience shows that the one factor
that can make a difference is the role of the speaker. In Ayeyarwady Region,
Hsan Hsint of the USDP was appointed inaugural speaker, and as has already
been seen, quickly proved to be a dynamic individual keen to assert power on
behalf of the assembly. Within a couple of years, however, he was promoted
to religious affairs minister in the national government in Naypyidaw, and
the assembly reverted to the type established by all of its counterparts.43 The
received wisdom among media commentators was that state leaders did not
want regional and state assemblies to be assertive and powerful, at least in
their ﬁrst ﬁve years of operation.
One key internal relationship problem that helps explain the balance of
power between the chief minister and the speaker is that in each decentralized
assembly the chief minister uniformly holds a higher previous (or at present
in Kayin State and Rakhine State, current) military rank than the speaker,
making it almost impossible for the speaker to assert any authority.
41. Unofﬁcially, many local people believe that the correct number of ethnic groups in Kachin
State is not 12 but 6, and that the larger number is either an honest mistake or, more darkly, an
attempt by national policymakers to undermine historic ethnic afﬁliations.
42. Sadan, Being and Becoming Kachin.
43. In June 2014, Hsan Hsint was removed from his ministerial post for not performing his duties
efﬁciently, and was charged with corruption (‘‘Burma’s President Sacks Religious Affairs Minister,’’
Irrawaddy, June 20, 2014).
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Moreover, the chief minister is advantaged by operating in both the decen-
tralized executive and the decentralized legislature. By contrast, the military
appointees in decentralized assemblies, collectively occupying 25 percent of all
seats, are not active politically. Rather, they are almost entirely reactive,
tending to speak only on constitutional or military matters and taking their
lead from key ﬁgures, such as the security and border affairs minister.
Broadly, the military appointees are a conservative force in the assemblies,
keeping business strictly to what is permitted by the constitution. Like the
generally governing USDP, but unlike the more unruly opposition parties,
which often have little discipline, they usually vote in a rigid manner. On one
occasion in the Yangon Region assembly, on the issue of licensing trishaw
drivers, the military bloc split between army members, who voted with the
regional government, and air force and navy members, who joined other
assembly members in voting against it. The split was sufﬁcient to overturn
an executive-backed initiative. However, this was a minor legislative case, and
in many respects is the exception that proves the rule.
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS . These range across links with constituents, party
organizations, civil society bodies, the public and private sectors, the media,
and so on. On the whole, none of these relationships is well developed. Links
with constituents are limited by the tight security surrounding many assem-
bly compounds, and the general difﬁculty of accessing them without a formal
appointment. At present, none of the assemblies is welcoming to constitu-
ents, and none has anything as basic as a visitors’ gallery. While some com-
mittee members undertake ﬁeld visits, they are not extensive. Often they are
made in response to complaints lodged either at the national level and ﬁltered
down through the system, or at the decentralized level itself. However, these
attempts at engagement are typically limited, and the assemblies as a group
are widely seen as detached from their constituents. Some assemblies have
tried to address this problem through use of the media. The assemblies in
Ayeyarwady Region, Shan State, and Tanintharyi Region all maintain Face-
book pages, for instance, and Tanintharyi has a dedicated cable television line
for live transmissions from the regional assembly in Dawei, plus a website in
the planning stage. Other assemblies have a live feed to a media room within
the assembly compound. From its ﬁfth session onward, the Kachin State
assembly issued its own newsletter. Some individual members, especially
from opposition parties, are keen to talk to journalists.
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Broadly, links with party organizations are strong in the case of the USDP
and weak in all other cases, reﬂecting the pattern found in voting records
inside the assemblies. Although the parties are gradually establishing repre-
sentative ofﬁces in the regions and states, these are not tied to the assemblies.
Links within the public sector are generally top-down, as has already been
explained. One organization brings together the speakers of all 14 regional
and state assemblies, and links them collectively to the national parliament.
Other than that, however, there are no formal links from the decentralized
tiers into the political center. Links with the private sector are highly under-
developed, with the two spheres seen as entirely separate. Links with civil
society bodies are underdeveloped to the point of being a rarity. It can even
be argued that the assemblies have no direct linkage with civil society. Indeed,
if anything the links are negative, with assembly members even from oppo-
sition parties expressing a lack of trust in civil society organizations and
believing them to be ﬁnancially corrupt. This reﬂects a more general impres-
sion within the political class that civil society organizations are typically
amateur charities rather than professional service providers.
Thus, although such organizations have substantial support at grass-roots
levels, they are not supported at the political level, and are certainly not
viewed as potential partners. Only in June 2014 was an attempt made to
bridge this gap. Then civil society groups announced that on a two-month
cycle over the next two years they planned to hold a people’s forum in each of
Myanmar’s 14 regions and states, beginning with Mon State that month. The
aim was to debate policy issues for presentation to the state government and
assembly, and to monitor implementation progress.44 In the ﬁrst year of this
planned initiative, little appeared to have come of it. Perhaps the only domain
in which links are being actively sought is with the media. In general, how-
ever, the major media outlets are not interested in the regional and state
assemblies, devoting almost all of their coverage to national affairs.
Looking beyondMyanmar, the assemblies have some informal international
contacts, with ministers occasionally getting the chance to travel overseas on
experience-sharing missions, and with some global bodies implementing pro-
grams that have implications for decentralized assemblies. One instance is an
initiative to empower female politicians, launched by Phan Tee Eain (Creative
44. Yen Snaing, ‘‘Civil Society Plans ‘Regional People’s Forum’ in Every State, Division,’’
Irrawaddy, June 17, 2014.
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Home), a local NGO founded in 2009. This initiative targets institutions at all
levels of the governance hierarchy and is not restricted to regional and state
assemblies.
ENGAGEMENT WITH KEY POL ICY I SSUES . This is a category we used to gauge
the importance of regional and state assemblies in the policy context of their
designated territories. It starkly revealed how marginalized they are. When
government ofﬁcials sought to tackle headline problems of sectarian violence
in Rakhine State and ethnic conﬂict in Kachin State, the state assemblies
played no substantial role, being at best conﬁned to logistical arrangements
for peace and reconciliation processes. In dealing with contentious matters of
economic development focused on a Chinese-backed copper mine project at
Letpadaung in Sagaing Region, the regional assembly was similarly unim-
portant. When a proposed Chinese-backed mining project in the Mwe
Taung Phar Taung area, on the border of Chin State’s Tiddim Township
and Sagaing Region’s Kale Township, became mired in controversy, the
speaker of the Chin State assembly sought to play a role as mediator, but
was prevented from doing so by the lack of a constitutional mandate.45 In
planning for urban development in Yangon and Mandalay, the two regional
assemblies were squeezed out of the policy process by national and munic-
ipal authorities. When the national parliament passed a Development
Funds Law in March 2014, it vested control of the MMK 33 billion (USD
33million) allocated to small-scale constituency projects in elected members
of parliament from Myanmar’s 330 townships, not in the decentralized
assemblies.46
During the period covered by our research, the only signiﬁcant exception
to this generalized bypassing of regional and state assemblies was found in
Mon State. There, in April 2014, the state assembly endorsed a plan to
formalize the teaching of the Mon language in all government primary
schools across the territory, signaling the ﬁrst break with a uniform Bamar-
language policy imposed on the entire country following the 1962 coup.47
45. Ei Ei Toe Lwin, ‘‘Chin Urge Transparency on Mwe Taung Mining Project,’’ Myanmar
Times, September 20, 2013.
46. Bart Robertson and Cindy Joelene, Local Development Funds in Myanmar: An Initial Review
(Yangon: MDRI-CESD, Asia Foundation and ActionAid Myanmar, 2015).
47. For background analysis, see Marie Lall and Ashley South, ‘‘Comparing Models of Non-state
Ethnic Education in Myanmar: The Mon and Karen National Education Regimes,’’ Journal of
Contemporary Asia 44:2 (2014), pp. 298–321.
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Students may also elect to study the ethnic Kayin or Pa-O languages.48
Possibly, this will prove to be a pointer to future engagement with issues
of culture and education by regional and state assemblies. To date, however,
it stands as a solitary instance of policy impact.
ANALYSIS
An evaluation of Myanmar’s 14 regional and state assemblies toward the end
of their initial ﬁve-year mandate can only conclude that they have made
a slow start. Assembly members comprise a narrow and unrepresentative
segment of the general population, and most are at both the start and ﬁnish
of their political careers. Structural factors work to the disadvantage of the
decentralized assemblies, which operate in the shadow not only of the
national executive and legislature (which in turn are dominated by military
and former-military ﬁgures), but also of the decentralized governments (over
which the central tier has considerable leverage). Internal relationships are
constrained, with the chief minister (appointed by the president) able to
control most important issues and thereby keep the assemblies on a tight
leash. External relationships are underdeveloped, leaving the assemblies
largely disconnected from the wider society in which they should be embed-
ded, and to which they should relate in signiﬁcant ways. Engagement in key
policy issues is minimal. Largely overlooked by the media and mainstream
political actors, all of which prefer to focus on the national level, the assem-
blies have made an inauspicious start. Compounding these general problems
are particular difﬁculties faced by small assemblies in small jurisdictions. It is
hard to argue that Kayah and Kayin States have functioning legislatures.
At best, then, this institution-building project is a work in progress.
There are nevertheless some glimmers of light. The sheer demonstration
effect of creating a functioning tier of government at the regional and state
level is starting to play out. Just as Myanmar’s ‘‘rigged election’’ in 2010
elicited ‘‘two cheers,’’ in that it at least took a step in the right direction and
created the conditions for future institutional development, so too might
regional and state assemblies.49 Indeed, in statements made by leaders at all
48. Lawi Weng, ‘‘Mon State to Allow Ethnic Language Classes in Govt Schools,’’ Irrawaddy,
April 10, 2014.
49. Neil A. Englehart, ‘‘Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election,’’ Asian Survey 52:4 (2012), pp.
666–686.
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levels of the political system, there is now not only an acceptance of these
bodies but also a desire to build them up and invest powers and resources in
them. Even some USDP regional and state ministers and members argue for
further decentralization, on the basis of experience to date, and the point is
slowly being picked up by national ﬁgures.
In July 2013, a new Region/State Hluttaw Law made minor changes to
legislation enacted in October 2010 by the outgoing junta. In August 2013,
Thein Sein called publicly for greater powers to be decentralized, and sub-
sequently wrote to all 14 regional and state assemblies inviting them to send
him a letter of complaint if the chief minister failed to implement their
decisions. In February 2014, a UN agency announced that it was adding to
its support for the national parliament a program to build capacity in regional
and state assemblies.50 Most signiﬁcantly, in July 2015 a second round of
largely failed attempts to amend the constitution did generate some progress
for decentralized assemblies. While a proposal allowing them to elect their
own chief ministers was voted down, successful amendments saw 34 lawmak-
ing powers added to Schedule Two of the constitution, and 20 tax-raising
powers added to Schedule Five. These will permit the assemblies greater
oversight of tourism, industrial zones, and wildlife protection, and will give
them limited tax-raising powers on income, commerce, and customs.51
Nevertheless, for regional and state assemblies to move from their current
recessive and reactive position within the wider political system to something
more meaningful, considerable reform will be necessary. In particular, key
issues of capacity and autonomy will have to be addressed. To function as real
decentralized legislatures, the assemblies must be allowed at a very basic level
to gain a minimum size even in small jurisdictions. More broadly, to under-
take decentralized functions, the assemblies require greater administrative
capacity and enhanced resources for ordinary members. They also need to
be enabled to address real citizen needs in areas such as health, education,
poverty eradication, and regional economic integration. At present, munic-
ipal mandates focus excessively on infrastructure projects and can often
secure, under this heading, top-up funding from the national level. In many
places, the result has been a mushrooming of public works projects such as
50. United Nations Development Programme, ‘‘UNDP Steps up Support to Myanmar’s State
and Regional Parliaments,’’ UNDP in Myanmar, February 10, 2014.
51. Yen Snaing, ‘‘Charter Push for Decentralization, Stronger Parliament Falters,’’ Irrawaddy, July
9, 2015.
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markets, small roads, and ofﬁce buildings. While many of these projects are
valuable, they do not confront the most fundamental social development
needs of citizens. Linked to these requirements is the need to loosen rigid
controls. On the one hand, the constitution is deeply constraining. On the
other, with the appointment of chief minister and the allocation of ministe-
rial portfolios all currently vested in the president, lines of accountability
inevitably ﬂow upward rather than downward. This places signiﬁcant limita-
tions on the assemblies’ capacity for independent action, and turns them into
little more than rubber-stamp institutions.
Major reforms are thus needed to make the assemblies real working parts
of the Myanmar political system, and to give them the kind of presence that
might be of interest to regional and state media. Small changes that could
easily be made include establishment of a system for citizen consultation on
draft bills that would link the assemblies more closely to grass-roots commu-
nities, and enhancement of assemblies’ capacity by encouraging them to
consult experienced individuals from key sectors affected by proposed legis-
lation. Larger changes include allowing the assemblies to elect their own chief
ministers, withdrawing from them military appointees (known to represent
an entrenched political establishment), substantially enhancing their tax col-
lection powers, and enabling them to allocate natural resource extraction
licenses within their jurisdictions.
While waiting for necessary constitutional reform to take place, minor but
signiﬁcant change could be introduced soon after Myanmar’s November 2015
general election. The choice of chief minister, currently vested in the presi-
dent, could for instance be undertaken in a new manner. Even without
revision of the relevant constitutional clause (Article 261), the incoming
president chosen by indirect election in the aftermath of the national poll
could inform all 14 regional and state assemblies that they should nominate
their preferred candidate for chief minister, and that he (or conceivably she)
will then merely endorse the choice. This would be one simple way of
enabling the state and regional assemblies to grow as institutions, despite
continuing deadlock over constitutional reform.
CONCLUSION
As Myanmar approaches its November general election, it faces a wide array
of governance challenges. Alongside everything else, the task of constructing
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a meaningful tier of government in the country’s 14 regions and states may
not seem especially important. To date, progress has certainly been poor.
However, at a fundamental level this remains a deeply fractured society, riven
by ethnic tension and conﬂict. Additionally, in the mainly Bamar core just as
much as in minority ethnic states, the experience of centralized, authoritarian
rule is still recent and therefore dominant. In these circumstances, it is
essential that determined efforts be made to invest in the decentralized tier,
build it up, and point the way to a genuine territorial dispersal of power.
Indeed, thoroughgoing reform of the country’s 14 regional and state assem-
blies would send positive signals to the ethnic nationality groups with whom
the government is seeking to build trust through the ongoing peace process,
and could thereby play a key role in generating a long-awaited solution to
Myanmar’s divisive ethnic conﬂict.
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